BOERTJE v. U.S., 569 A.2d 586 (D.C.App. 1989)
Gregory I. BOERTJE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 85-1408.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued February 16, 1989.
Decided October 31, 1989.

  Appeal from the Superior Court, Bruce D. Beaudin, J.
Page 587

  Nina Kraut, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for
appellant.

  Kathleen A. Brandon, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B.
Stephens, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty. at
the time the brief was filed, and Mary Ellen Abrecht, Asst.
U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

  Before BELSON and TERRY, Associate Judges, and MACK,
Associate Judge, Retired.[fn*]

[fn*] Judge Mack was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of
argument. Her status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on
October 1, 1989.

  TERRY, Associate Judge:

  Appellant was convicted of unlawful entry[fn1] for having refused
to leave the White House grounds when directed to do so by a
person in lawful authority. On appeal he argues that he was
engaging in symbolic speech at the White House and that the
government failed to prove an additional specific factor
establishing his lack of a legal right to remain there. He also
contends that the trial court denied him the right to make an
opening statement and to present an effective defense, and that
the court erred in refusing to ask certain questions of the
venire during the voir dire.
Page 588

  Appellant's first argument is unsupported by the evidence.
His voir dire argument, although it has some merit with respect
to one question, does not warrant reversal. His other
contentions are totally without merit and are, in any event,
affirmatively refuted by the record.

                                I

  On December 29, 1984, the day after the feast of the Holy
Innocents,[fn2] appellant Boertje and a companion, along with a
group of tourists, entered the grounds of the White House
through the visitors' center on East Executive Avenue. As
appellant entered the visitors' center, he walked past a posted
sign containing this message:

    The White House and grounds are protected by the
  United States Secret Service and the United States
  Secret Service Uniform Division, pursuant to 18
  U.S. Code 3056 and 3 U.S. Code 22. To assure your
  enjoyment of your tour and to assist in the
  protection of the properties, all persons entering
  this property are advised that any activity that
  disrupts the tour or impedes the flow of
  pedestrian traffic is prohibited. Thank you for
  your cooperation, and please enjoy your visit to
  the White House.

To ensure an orderly flow of pedestrian traffic through the
White House grounds, the paved tour route is bordered along its
entire length by a line of metal stanchions connected by metal
chains. Tour guides are also stationed along the route to
remind visitors that they must keep the line moving.

  Sergeant Roland Mayclin of the Secret Service was the senior
uniformed officer on duty that morning on the north grounds of
the White House. As such, he had the authority to ask any
person who was disrupting a tour or impeding pedestrian traffic
to leave the grounds. Thus, when Mayclin saw Boertje and his
companion stop along the tour route, he asked them to keep pace
with the normal flow of pedestrian traffic. Boertje replied,
"I'm not going to leave. You'll have to arrest me." As he spoke
these words, Boertje knelt down on the paved walkway. Sergeant
Mayclin repeated his request, this time telling Boertje that he
would be subject to arrest for unlawful entry if he refused to
get up and leave. Boertje did not respond. Mayclin made the
same request of Boertje's companion, who thereupon walked out
the gate "in the normal manner." Boertje, however, remained
kneeling and gave no response when Mayclin asked him for the
third time to get up and move along. Consequently, on the
orders of Sergeant Mayclin, Boertje was arrested by Secret
Service Officer Michael Redwine, who had walked over to assist
Mayclin.

  At trial Boertje did not refute the government's version of
the facts as they were recounted by Mayclin and Redwine. He
admitted seeing the posted warning sign at the visitors'
center, admitted entering the White House grounds "with the
intent of risking arrest," admitted being asked several times
by Sergeant Mayclin to get up off his knees and move along the
tour line or risk arrest, and admitted refusing to do so. He
defended his actions by telling the court that he was acting on
his belief that the "first strike" nuclear capability of the
United States was contrary to the teachings of God and an
international crime against peace as defined by the
Nürnberg tribunal.[fn3] According to Boertje, he chose the
White House grounds for his protest because in his view the
President was primarily responsible for this country's nuclear
weapons policy.

  In anticipation of his defense, Boertje,
Page 589
who served as his own attorney at trial,[fn4] proposed a lengthy set
of voir dire questions, all but two of which the trial court
rejected as irrelevant. Boertje claims that the trial court
erred in refusing to ask the remaining two voir dire questions
in the form requested. Additionally, he argues that the
unlawful entry statute as applied to him violated his free
speech rights under the First Amendment, and that he was denied
an opportunity to make an opening statement and to put on the
defense he wanted.[fn5]

                               II

  The White House differs from all other properties owned by
the United States government because it is the official
residence of the President. Because of its unique nature, the
exercise of citizens' First Amendment right of free speech on
the White House grounds may be regulated in a "more stringent
[manner] . . . than would be tolerated on most other government
properties." Smith v. United States, 445 A.2d 961, 965 (D.C.
1982) (en banc); accord, Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803,
808 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 1654, 52
L.Ed.2d 362 (1977). Of course, any restriction on the exercise
of First Amendment rights, at the White House or elsewhere,
must be content-neutral, non-discriminatory, and no broader
than "reasonably necessary . . . [to serve] significant
government interests." Smith v. United States, supra, 445 A.2d
at 964-965 (citing cases). Boertje contends that by kneeling
down on the tourist path he was engaging in symbolic speech,
and that it was unreasonable for the Secret Service officers to
arrest him rather than to permit him to stay on the grounds at
least until visiting hours were over, as was done in Leiss v.
United States, supra. We reject his argument because there are
significant factual differences between Leiss and this case.

  In Leiss two protesters entered the White House grounds with
a tour group, stationed themselves near the entrance gate, and
began to read a statement in opposition to United States
foreign policy. They were told by an Executive Protective
Service officer that they could stand there and continue to
read their statement until the noon closing hour, but that if
they remained on the grounds after that time, they would be
subject to arrest. When the visiting hours were over and the
gates were about to be closed, Leiss refused to leave and was
arrested.

  Here, on the other hand, Boertje simply knelt down without
saying a word. When Sergeant Mayclin asked him to get up and
proceed along the tour route, all that Boertje said was "I'm
not going to leave. You'll have to arrest me." These were the
only words he spoke before he was arrested. Even though Mayclin
asked him twice more to get up and move along and told him that
he would be subject to arrest for unlawful entry if he refused
to do so, Boertje said nothing further. According to the
evidence, Boertje never told Sergeant Mayclin, Officer Redwine,
or anyone else at the White House that he was protesting
against United States nuclear weapons policy. Unlike the
officers in Leiss, who were informed of the protesters'
intentions, Sergeant Mayclin and Officer Redwine had no way of
knowing what Boertje's intentions were or what his message was.

  The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that a person
cannot claim the protection of the First Amendment without
engaging or attempting to engage in some kind of communication,
either by speech or by conduct. "[I]t is the obligation of the
person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to
demonstrate that the
Page 590
First Amendment even applies. To hold otherwise would be to
create a rule that all conduct is presumptively expressive."
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069 n. 5, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). We are
unpersuaded by Boertje's argument that the mere act of
kneeling, without more, is symbolic speech protected by the
First Amendment. When compared with acts found to have a
communicative element, there was no reasonable likelihood that
Boertje's act conveyed to those who saw it any message at all,
let alone a message that he was expressing his dissatisfaction
with United States nuclear weapons policy. Compare Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41
L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (display of an American flag bearing a peace
symbol and hung upside down during a time of political
turmoil); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)
(wearing of black armbands to protest continuing American
involvement in Vietnam); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (burning a draft card
on the courthouse steps at a time when hostilities in Vietnam
were escalating).[fn6]

  Sergeant Mayclin had no way of knowing why Boertje suddenly
fell to his knees in front of the White House. Since Boertje's
conduct failed to "convey a particularized message," Spence v.
Washington, supra, 418 U.S. at 411, 94 S.Ct. at 2730, it
necessarily follows that his arrest could not have been
content-based[fn7] and that his First Amendment rights were not
violated. Given the complex security problems involved in
protecting the President and his residence, we cannot find
fault with the police response to Boertje's uncommunicative
conduct. See Smith v. United States, supra, 445 A.2d at
966-967.

  Along these same lines, Boertje argues that the government
failed to prove an "additional specific factor establishing
[his] lack of a legal right to remain [on the White House
grounds]." O'Brien v. United States, 444 A.2d 946, 948 (D.C.
1982) (citations omitted). The requirement of an "additional
specific factor" has been developed by this court to guard
against the infringement of First Amendment rights by
government officials seeking to eject citizens from public
property in reliance on the unlawful entry statute. See
Wheelock v. United States, 552 A.2d 503, 505 (D.C. 1988);
Carson v. United States, 419 A.2d 996, 998 (D.C. 1980). In this
case, because the officers had no way of knowing why Boertje
knelt down on the tour path and refused to leave when asked
three times to do so, there was no evidence that he was
exercising his First Amendment rights, and there was no need to
prove an "additional specific factor." But even assuming that
there was such a need, we would have to hold that the
requirement was met by the posted sign at the visitors'
entrance stating that "any activity that disrupts the tour or
impedes the flow of pedestrian traffic is
Page 591
prohibited."[fn8] The evidence showed that Boertje's continued
presence on the well-trod tourist path potentially, if not
actually, threatened to interfere with the important
governmental interest of maintaining a free flow of pedestrian
traffic at the White House. See Abney v. United States,
451 A.2d 78, 83-84 (D.C. 1982); Carson v. United States, supra, 419
A.2d at 998. The posted sign promoted that interest and
established Boertje's lack of a legal right to kneel where he
knelt and to remain there for an indefinite period of time.
Id.; see Whittlesey v. United States, 221 A.2d 86, 89 (D.C.
1966).

  For these reasons we find no merit in any of Boertje's First
Amendment arguments.

                               III

  Just before the trial began, before the voir dire of the
jury, the court ruled that Boertje could not raise the defenses
of "justifiable presence" or obedience to international law.
Boertje asserts that this ruling denied him the opportunity to
put on the defense he wanted, including expert testimony
(although he does not identify any expert or state what his or
her testimony would have been). He also says that the court's
ruling discouraged him from making an opening statement. The
record plainly shows, however, not only that Boertje made an
opening statement but that it was quite a detailed one,
extending over five pages of transcript. The record also shows
that Boertje, over the government's repeated objections, was
given wide latitude in presenting his defense.

  First, he was allowed to explain why he chose the White House
for the site of his kneel-in. Then, when the government
objected to a line of questioning about Boertje's opposition to
nuclear weapons, the court overruled the objection
(acknowledging nevertheless that it was appropriate) and
allowed Boertje to tell the jury why he felt he was justified
in kneeling on the White House grounds. When Boertje began to
discuss international law and the Nürnberg trials, the
government once again objected, but the court allowed him to
explain why he felt he was obligated by international law to
protest the "crime" of nuclear weapons proliferation. When
Boertje started talking about the religious underpinnings of
his action, the government objected again, but the court
permitted him to finish his testimony. Finally, when Boertje
was asked at the end of his direct examination if he wanted to
say anything more, he paused and said, "That's it." This
statement strongly suggests that he said all he wanted to say
in his defense. On this record we find no substance in
Boertje's contention that the court precluded him from
presenting the defense he wanted to present.

  In any event, a claim by Boertje that he was justified under
either international or divine law to remain kneeling on the
White House grounds would not have been, on the facts of this
case, a valid defense to the charge of unlawful entry. See
Shiel v. United States, 515 A.2d 405, 409 (D.C. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 1477, 99 L.Ed.2d 706 (1988);
Morgan v. District of Columbia, 476 A.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C.
1984); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979);
Leiss v. United States, supra, 364 A.2d at 809. Courts have
held that the defense Boertje wanted to present is not
available to those who protest against nuclear power or nuclear
weapons by trespassing on the property of facilities that
produce nuclear power or weapons. See, e.g., United States v.
Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 789, 74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983); United States v.
Best, 476 F. Supp. 34, 42-49 (D.Colo. 1979). The fact that the
trial judge eventually allowed such a defense to be made does
not mean that he realized his earlier ruling was wrong. Rather,
it indicates to us that the judge was bending over backwards to
give Boertje as much latitude
Page 592
as he reasonably could in defending himself without turning the
courtroom into a political forum, which would have been
inappropriate.

                               IV

  At the beginning of the voir dire, Boertje presented to the
court a host of questions for the prospective jurors. The court
refused to ask most of the proposed questions on the ground of
irrelevancy, and we find no abuse of discretion in its doing
so.[fn9] We are somewhat troubled by the court's decision not to ask
one particular question, viz., whether a family member or close
friend of any of the potential jurors worked either for a
government agency that handles nuclear materials, such as the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, or for a
company that manufactures or designs nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapon systems. We hold nevertheless that the court's failure
to ask this question was not an abuse of discretion.

  When Boertje first proposed this question, the court was
inclined to ask it, apparently in the form suggested by
Boertje. Eventually, however, the court asked a more general
question, namely, whether any of the prospective jurors or
their relatives or close friends had "any strong feelings,
either for or against a person who has participated in one or
more political or religious protests . . . [or] about someone
who might be considered to be a political activist or a
religious activist." One person responded. After the voir dire
was completed, each party was given an opportunity to strike
any prospective juror for cause. Boertje struck no one for
cause. Both parties then exercised their peremptory challenges,
and a jury was empaneled.

  Voir dire serves to assure an accused, as far as possible, an
impartial jury by exposing any juror biases that might affect
the verdict. See Jenkins v. United States, 541 A.2d 1269, 1272
(D.C. 1988). How such biases will be uncovered during voir dire
is left to the trial court's broad discretion, and its rulings
will be affirmed on appeal unless the record reveals an abuse
of discretion coupled with substantial prejudice to the
defendant. See, e.g., id. at 1272; Musgrove v. United
States, 441 A.2d 980, 983 (D.C. 1982); Khaalis v. United
States, 408 A.2d 313, 335 (D.C. 1979); cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1092, 100 S.Ct. 1059, 62 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980). In the case at
bar, we think the trial judge's initial reaction to the
question was probably correct; he should have asked the
potential jurors whether any of their relatives or close
friends worked in the nuclear industry, especially for the
military or the government. We conclude nevertheless that
Boertje was not substantially prejudiced by the judge's
decision to reformulate the question into one about protesters
in general.[fn10]
Page 593

  Just because a particular issue in a trial might conceivably
prejudice some venire members against a defendant, the
defendant does not always have a right to voir dire questions
specifically directed to that issue. See Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976).
Moreover, if a court decides to ask a voir dire question
suggested by a defendant, it is not obliged to ask the question
exactly as proposed; instead, the court may alter the wording
and make it more general. In this case it would probably have
been the wiser course to explore more thoroughly the
possibility of juror prejudice by including a question along
the lines suggested by Boertje. Nevertheless, we are satisfied
that the question ultimately asked by the court sufficiently
probed the prospective jurors' ability to be impartial. See,
e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188-193,
101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634-36, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (not error to ask venire members about prejudice
against aliens generally, rather than prejudice against
Mexicans specifically);[fn11] Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at
594-598, 96 S.Ct. at 1022 (not error to inquire generally about
prejudice, rather than specifically about racial prejudice);
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138-140, 94 S.Ct. 2887,
2917-18, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (no abuse of discretion in trial
court's refusal to ask specific questions about educational,
political, and religious biases); Musgrove v. United States,
supra, 441 A.2d at 983 ("while appellant's specific questions
were not posed during voir dire, the jurors' feelings about
police misconduct were explored to some extent"); Jacobs v.
Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1257 (3d Cir.) (failure to ask
specifically whether venire members knew victims of crime was
not abuse of discretion, since other questions were "sufficient
to elicit information sought by defendant"), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 2170, 64 L.Ed.2d 799 (1980). The fact that
Boertje considered himself to be a protester against nuclear
armaments did not automatically entitle him to specific voir
dire questions to probe the prospective jurors' views on that
subject. See State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 87, 427 A.2d 3, 6
(1981).

  Even assuming that some of the prospective jurors had
relatives or friends whose employment was in some way connected
with the manufacture or development of nuclear weapons,
Boertje's entitlement to a specific voir dire question would
depend on whether testimony on American nuclear policy impacted
on the trial as a whole, see Jenkins v. United States, supra,
541 A.2d at 1274, or, put another way, whether Boertje's views
on nuclear proliferation were "inextricably bound up with the
conduct of [his] trial." Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at
597, 96 S.Ct. at 1021; accord, Cordero v. United States,
456 A.2d 837, 842 (D.C. 1983); cf. Connors v. United States,
158 U.S. 408, 15 S.Ct. 951, 39 L.Ed. 1033 (1895) (voir dire is
designed to uncover juror bias only on the issues to be tried,
not to explore the jurors' political beliefs). Boertje's views
on nuclear proliferation had no impact whatever on the case as
a whole, nor were his views inextricably bound up with the
conduct of his trial. His beliefs about nuclear war were
irrevelant to the charge of unlawful entry for the same reason
that the asserted abridgment of his First Amendment rights was
irrelevant: he never told anyone in authority at the White
House why he was obstructing the tourist path and refusing to
move.

  This case is easily distinguishable from Cordero v. United
States, supra, on which Boertje places great reliance. Cordero
was arrested when, from the gallery of the United States
Senate, he shouted slogans in opposition to American foreign
and domestic policy. In addition to verbalizing his
disenchantment with capitalist oppression, Cordero flung
leaflets into the air which contained the same basic message as
his oral pronouncements. Two Capitol Police officers heard him
shouting and saw the leaflets. At his trial Cordero planned to
Page 594
defend on the ground that he was a member of the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War and the Revolutionary Communist Party
and was exercising his First Amendment right to express his
political views. This court held that Cordero's political
beliefs and affiliations were "among the basic facts underlying
his alleged offense; they would be evident to the jury as soon
as the jury learned (as inevitably it would from the
government's case-in-chief) what he said in his protest
statement and had the opportunity to examine the leaflet." 456
A.2d at 844 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). Cordero's
conviction was reversed because the trial court failed to
conduct a more detailed voir dire.[fn12]

  At Boertje's trial, on the other hand, the government
introduced no evidence relating to Boertje's views on nuclear
weapons. Nor was it obliged to do so, since Boertje had failed
to tell the two Secret Service officers why he was kneeling in
front of the White House, and there was no evidence of any
literature being distributed to show why he was there. In
short, Boertje's religious and political views were totally
irrelevant to the government's case. In light of the
uncontroverted evidence that Boertje gave the officers no
reason for his unusual behavior — behavior that could be
characterized as threatening, or at least suspicious, under the
circumstances — all the government had to do was to prove that
Boertje did not leave the grounds when asked. Unlike the
situation in Cordero, the reason behind Boertje's action was
known only to Boertje at the time he was arrested. His purpose
for doing what he did was therefore not "inextricably bound up
with" his trial,[fn13] Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at 597, 96
S.Ct. at 1021, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it elected to ask the venire only a general question about
protesters, rather than a specific question about employment in
the nuclear industry.

  The judgment of conviction is accordingly

  Affirmed.

[fn1] D.C.Code § 22-3102 (1989).

[fn2] Fearing that the newborn infant Jesus would take his throne
away from him, King Herod calculated the time of Jesus' birth
from information given to him by the Magi. He then ordered the
massacre of all male children in Bethlehem and the surrounding
region who were two years old and under. See Matthew 2:7-8,
16-18. The slaughtered children came to be known as the Holy
Innocents, and their feast day is generally celebrated on
December 28.

[fn3] Boertje testified that he was a member of Jonah House, a
Baltimore-based community "dedicated to full-time resistance
against nuclear weapons."

[fn4] Although Boertje proceeded pro se, the court nevertheless
permitted an attorney to assist him, during both the pre-trial
proceedings and the trial itself. That attorney now represents
him on appeal.

[fn5] He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal. This argument is patently
without merit. See, e.g., McEachin v. United States,
432 A.2d 1212, 1217-1218 (D.C. 1981).

[fn6] Only a few months ago the Supreme Court had occasion once
again to consider the issue of conduct as protected speech.
While recognizing that the protection of the First Amendment
"does not end at the spoken or written word," the Court also
reiterated the test for determining when conduct may be
entitled to such protection:

    In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient
  communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into
  play, we have asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a
  particularized message was present, and [whether] the
  likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
  those who viewed it."

Texas v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2539, 105
L.Ed.2d 342 (1989), quoting Spence v. Washington, supra, 418
U.S. at 409, 94 S.Ct. at 2729. In our view, Boertje's conduct
clearly fails both parts of this test.

[fn7] In his opening statement, Boertje said that he had
participated in a "Peace yes, arms no" march around the White
House earlier that day, and that just before he knelt down, he
unfurled a banner with those words on it. An opening statement,
however, is not evidence. See Robinson v. United States,
361 A.2d 199, 200 (D.C. 1976). Notwithstanding Boertje's opening
statement, no evidence was presented at trial, either by him or
by the government, showing that there was a march, a banner, or
any other words or actions that might have alerted the officers
to the purpose behind Boertje's kneeling down.

[fn8] An additional specific factor, under O'Brien and other cases,
"may consist of posted regulations, signs or fences and
barricades regulating the public's use of government property,
or other reasonable restrictions." Carson, supra, 419 A.2d at
998.

[fn9] For example, Boertje wanted the court to ask whether any
member of the venire (1) was familiar with the significance of
the feast of the Holy Innocents (see note 2, supra); (2) was
aware that international law, as determined in the
Nürnberg trials in post-Nazi Germany, outlawed certain
kinds of warfare; (3) knew that the First Amendment prohibited
the federal government from establishing any religion; (4) had
heard of a West German group calling itself "Judges and
Prosecutors for Peace"; (5) knew of the events in Nazi Germany
that had culminated in the mass murder of millions of Jews; (6)
had heard that Christian principles were inconsistent with
nuclear proliferation; (7) had heard of the belief that one
cannot worship both God and the bomb; (8) was aware that there
were, on the average, seven false nuclear alarms per day; or
(9) was familiar with the theory of a nuclear winter. Boertje
also requested several biblically-based questions.

  After the trial court repeatedly rejected his requests,
Boertje proposed the following voir dire question: "Is anyone
here familiar with Jesus' parable of the persistent widow and
the unjust judge?" See Luke 18:1-5. The court ruled this
question irrelevant as well.

[fn10] We note in any event that Boertje's claim of prejudice is
unparticularized and speculative. He has made no showing that
any juror had friends or relatives employed in the nuclear
industry. Cf. Jones v. United States, 386 A.2d 308, 316 (D.C.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 263, 62 L.Ed.2d
181 (1979); United States v. Cockerham, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 97,
99, 476 F.2d 542, 544 (1973). At least one court has held that
even when members of a jury had ties to either the military or
defense contractors, such ties were too remote to establish
bias toward those who were prosecuted for breaking the law in
protest against the nuclear arms race. Commonwealth v.
Berrigan, 369 Pa. Super. 145, 158, 535 A.2d 91, 98 (1987).

[fn11] Two concurring justices in Rosales-Lopez would have gone
further than the plurality and "would [have left] somewhat more
to the trial court's discretion . . . the decision as to
whether or not [such] questions . . . should be asked on voir
dire." Rosales-Lopez, supra, 451 U.S. at 195, 101 S.Ct. at
1637.

[fn12] Among the questions which Cordero sought to ask were:

    Have you read or heard anything about other protest
  activities of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War [or] the
  Revolutionary Communist Party[?] If so, would anything you
  have heard or read come into play in your consideration of
  this case? . . .

    Have any of you or any close friends, family members, or
  associates ever been a member of any organization which had
  as one of its objectives opposition to Communism?

    Cordero, supra, 456 A.2d at 843-844. We held that the trial
  court should have incorporated the substance of these
  questions into its voir dire.

[fn13] For this reason we need not decide whether the nuclear weapons
policy of the United States is a matter about which "either the
local community or the population at large is commonly known to
harbor strong feelings." Cordero v. United States, supra, 456
A.2d at 842 (citation omitted).